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ABSTRACT
An index of Inequality is constructed which decomposes into two components,
corresponding to vertical and "horizontal" equity respectively. Horizontal
equity Is defined in terms of changes in the ordering of a distribution.
The proposed index is a function to two inequality aversion parameters. One
empirical application is for comparison of a pre—tax distribution with a
post—tax distribution, and an example of this is given for the distribution
of incomes in the UK in 1977. There is a trade—off between "horizontal"
and vertical equity, and for particular combinations of the inequality aver-
sion parameters the original distribution.will be preferred to the final
distribution. The paper concludes with an application of the proposed index
to a model of optimal taxation.
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It is conventional to assess the merits of alternative public
policies in terms of a trade—off between equity and efficiency.In
practice, however, a change in, say,the tax system involves three
effects.First, it may have incentive or disincentive effects leading
to efficiency gains or losses. Secondly, it may alter the distribution
of welfare levels.Thirdly, it may alter the ranking of individuals
(or households) within the distribution.These three effects
correspond to efficiency, vertical equity, and (certain aspects of)
"horizontal equity" respectively, and any assessment of a tax change
must take into account all three.The principal assumption of this
paper is that the government is concerned about the trade—off between
these three effects.
The introduction of changes in the ranking into the
evaluation of a distribution is an example of how iion—utility
considerations may enter social rankings (See Sen (1979) and Pattanaik
(1980)).Abandoning "welfarism", to use Sen's terminology, enables us
This research was supported by SSRC programme grant HR 4652 on
Taxation, Incentives and the Distribution of Income.I am very grateful
to A.B. Atkinson, F.A. Cowell, P. Grout, P.K. Pattanaik, and N.H. Stern
for many helpful comments and suggestions.to take account of the. status which policy—makers may wish to give to
the pre—tax or pre—reform distribution.We shall proceed on the
assumption that the relevant consideration is the effect of a
policy change on the ranking of individuals in the distribution.
The relationship between this concept and conventional notions of
horizontal equity and social mobility is discussed below. Only
certain aspects of horizontal equity as discussed in the literature,
can be captured by a measure of the change in ranking of utilities,
but we shall argue that in these cases an index may be constructed
which has empirical relevance in describing the effects of a proposed
reform to policy—makers.
Indexes of vertical equity (or "inequality") abound, whereas
there is no widely used index of horizontal equity.But, as Musgrave
(1959, p.160) has commented in his discussion of the two principles
of vertical and horizontal equity, "an objective index of inequality
is needed to translate either principle into a specific tax system".
The use of an "objective" statistical index to measure the concept of
vertical inequality is open to well—known objections, and has led to
the adoption of normative measures (see, for example, Atkinson 1970,
Cowell 1977 and Sen 1973). Similar arguments apply also to the
measurement of horizontal inequity.Nevertheless, we shall show
that if we stipulate certain requirements for an index of horizontal
equity, there exists a unique index characterised by a parameter
which describes the degree of"aversion to horizontal inequity". The
index of horizontal inequity may be combined with an index of vertical
inequity to give an overall measure of inequality, nd in turn this
can be compared with the efficiency gains or losses of a particular
reform.We shall show also that the same approach yields an index
of social mobility which appears to overcome many of the problems- 3—.
which have been encountered in previousattempts to produce an index.
In this way we hope that the proposed index willsupplement
the usual analysis of tax reforms in terms of their effectson the
level and distribution of welfare, (as illustratedby Rosen (1976)),
by allowing considerations of horizontal equity to be taken into
account explicitly.The aim is to develop a theoretical measure
which will provide a useful extension to theempirical analysis of
tax changes.When evaluating a proposal, politiciansare often
interested not only in theaverage gain which will accrue to a
particular income group, but also in the distribution ofgains and
losses within the group.Their concern might take the rather crude
form of wishing to know simply the numbers of thosewho would gain
and of those who would lose from theproposal in question. But,
more generally, the social valuation of the expost distribution will
take into account the ex—ante distribution fromwhich it is derived,
and, in particular, any change in the ordering of the distribution
which is induced by the move.The idea behind this is the following.
Imagine a reform which leaves average incomeunchanged, but which
leads to a compression of the distribution suchthat the Lorenz curve
for the ex post distribution lies entirely within that for the ex—
ante distribution.If we are concerned with vertical equity alone
then there has been an unambiguous reduction in inequality, and the
reform would be favouredJBut suppose that the reform involves
also a permutation of the order of individuals in the distribution
giving rise to"horizontal inequities" The evaluation of the reform
may no longer be so clearcut.
1Given theassumption that social welfare (as a function of individual
incomes) is S—concave.—4—
The distinction between the effect of a tax on the shape of
the distribution and its effect on the ranking of the distribution is
illustrated by the concept of "progression".The conventional
definition of a progessive tax (on income, for example) is that the
proportion of an individual's pre—tax income which is paid in tax
is an increasing function of his income.But we could equally well
define progression with respect to the tax paid as a proportion of
post—tax income. The difference between the two is simply the
difference between tax—inclusive and tax—exclusive rates of tax.
Provided there is no change in the ranking of the distribution the
two measures will give the same answer and a tax which is progressive
(regressive) in terms of the pre—tax distribution will be progressive
(regressive) also if measured in terms of the post—tax distribution.
But when there is a change in the ordering the two measures give
conflicting answers.This is illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1
Income
Before Tax After Tax A After Tax B
1 10 5 4
Individual
2 6 4 5
It shows the incomes of two individuals before tax and also after tax
for two taxes A and B.The effects on the distribution of income of
the two taxes are identical.Tax A is clearly progressive whether we
measure progression in terms of pre—tax or of post—tax income.This
is not, however, true of tax B.In terms of pre—tax incomes, tax B—5—
is certainly progressive with tax rates of 16.7% on the poorer and
60% on the richer individuals.But as a proportion of disposable
income the tax weighs more heavily on the individual with the smaller
post—tax income, and in this sense is clearly regressive.This
conflict in the measure of progression arises because the tax changes
the ordering of the distribution. The anibiguity results from a tax
change which reduces vertical inequity on the one hand but creates
horizontal inequity on the other.The trade—off between the two will
depend upon social judgements about the two types of inequity, and
one of the aims of our proposed index of horizontal equity is to help
make these judgements explicit. If the policy—maker is concerned
not only with the post—tax distribution of incomes, but more generally
with "what is, what was, and what might have been", then he will
attach some significance to the initial distribution.The process
by which redistribution is brought about is relevant, and I ou1d
venture the empirical statement that politicians would like their
economic advisers to provide them with information about the effects
of a policy on the change in ranking of households, in addition to
the usual summary statistics of the ex post distribution.
Changes in ordering may occur for a variety of reasons.
Some may be deliberate on the part of government.But if we assume
that those characteristics which the government wishes torecognise
as warranting differential treatment (such as household size or state
of health) are subsumed into the utility function, thenchanges in the
ordering of utilities will represent undesired horizontal inequitiesj
1
The term "utility function" means here the social valuation of the
vector of arguments of the function for a given household.—6—
A government may wish to pay little or no attention to these changes
in ordering or it may be much concerned by them; the social valuation
of these changes is an ethical judgement.
One example of a tax—induced change in ordering is provided
by the effects of an income tax in a world of heterogenous preferences.
Individuals with a relatively strong preference for leisure will be
favoured at the expense of those with a greater preference for
consumption.Administrative constraints on the amount of information
which can be incorporated in the design of the tax system may also
lead to horizontal inequities.Regional variations in the price
level are ignored by a national tax system.Housing allowances,
based on rents paid are unable to discriminate between households
which face high unit costs for housing and households which choose
to consume a lot of housing services. This factor is likely to be
taken into account by a government contemplating the introduction of
a scheme of housing allowances, and will be set against any benefits
in terms of efficiency or vertical equity which the scheme offers.
Attempts to remove or reduce the privileged tax treatment
of some marketable assets (such as owner—occupied housing) run up
against the problem that existing distortions have been capitalised.
Proposals for a gradual transition reflect concern about the
horizontal inequities which would result from immediate withdrawal
of the tax concessions.Finally, the administration of the tax system
and the use of random audits result in erors in tax payments by some
individuals.Moreover, the sheer complexity of the tax system may
lead taxpayers themselves to make mistakes in their labour supply
and consumption decisions.The empirical significance of an index of horizontal equity
is enhanced by the growing exploitation of micro—data files with
observations on individual households.With individual observations
we are able to compare the ranking of the distribution both before
and after any particular change in taxes or benefits. Simulation
of tax reforms can encompass horizontal as well as vertical equity.
The change in ranking involved in moving from pre—tax to thepost-
tax distribution has been discussed by Atkinson (1980) who examines
the effects of re—ranking on conventional measures of inequality
such as the Cmi coefficient.But he does not consider the
welfare significance of mobility as such.In this paper we focus
on the evaluation of changes in ranking.
Section 2 discusses further theconcept of horizontal equity
and an index is constructed in section 3. In section 4 we show how
the index may be modified to yield an index of socialmobility. An
illustration of the use of the index is given in section5, and
section 6 discusses theoretical applications of the indexto models
in which policy changes involve a trade—off betweenvertical and
horizontal equity.A simple example of the use of the index in
models of optimal taxation is examined.
2.Horizontal Equity
There is a widespread belief that a taxsystem should meet
the double criteria of vertical and horizontalequity (see, for
example, Musgrave (1959, 1976)).But the concept of horizontal
equity has played little role in the literature on optimal—8—
taxation?Undoubtedly, the main reason for this is the difficulty
of giving precise expression to the concept of equal treatment of
those equally situated.The most useful definition of horizontal
equity is that of Feldstein (1976), "if two individuals would be
equally well off (have the same utility level) in the absence of
2
taxation, they should also be equally well off if there is a taxt.
The extension of this definition to the case of tax reform (a
comparison of two positive levels of taxation) is straightforward 3.
In practice, of course, no two individuals are ever identical, andto
deal with this problem we are led naturally to a comparison of the
ordering of utility levels before and after a tax change. Horizontal
equity implies that a tax should leave unchanged the ranking of
4
utility levels.
Horizontal equity and vertical equity are distinct, though
related criteria.They are related in so far as a discussion of
vertical equity cannot proceed without some assumptions about which
characteristics should be incorporated directly into themeasure of
utility —forexample, if utility is a function only of income we
would normally wish to compare household incomes adjustedto "adlt
equivalent"levels.But more relevant for our purposes is the
possible clash between horizontal and vertical equity.Pursuit of
one criterion may lead to violation of the other.Atkinson and
'Exceptions to this are Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) and Stern (1979)
2Horizontal equity may be defined also in terms of equality of budget
sets (Gordon 1976), but it is not clear that this approach, in terms
of opportunities rather than preferences, is sufficiently comprehensive
as the concept of differing "needs" illustrates.
3See Feldstein op. cit. p.95.
4This is also stated by Feldstein (op. cit. p.83).—9—
Stiglitz (1980) show that even where individuals possess identical
preferences and endowments, ruaximisation of a social welfare
function expressing social judgements about vertical equity does
not necessarily imply equal tax rates for identical individuals.
If the feasible set is non—convex equal tax rates may character—
ise a local minimum of welfare, and the social optimum will
involve random taxes.Once differences in preferences and endowments
are admitted the conflict between horizontal and vertical equity is
readily apparent.An income tax discriminates between those with
different tastes for leisure and between those with different skills
(which, for the same money income, may entail different working
conditions and job satisfaction).
But perhaps the most striking theoretical example of the
conflict between vertical and horizontal equity arises in the model
used by Mirrlees (1971) to examine optimal income taxation.In that
model individuals had identical preferences (defined over consumption
and leisure) and differed only in respect of their potentialwage
rates or ability levels.Clearly, in the absence of taxation
individual utility is an increasing function of ability.Suppose
the government uses redistributive lump—sum taxes to achieve the
first—best optimum.Then, as Mirrlees (1971, 1977) shows, the first—
best optimum for a utilitarian social welfare function has theproperty
that individual utility is a decreasing function of ability (provided
leisure is a normal good).In other words, the optimum from the point
of view of vertical equity is characterised by a complete reversal of
the ranking of utilities.Some attention has been paid to the
incentive problems which result from such an outcome, because it would
not be difficult for individuals to pretend to have less abilitythan they in fact have.'Where this is possible and individuals
differ in respect o,f only one type of ability, then the optimum is
equal utility for all (see Allingham (1975) and Mirrlees (1977)).
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This solution is identical. to the optimum for the case in which
ability may be observed but where there is complete aversion to
horizontal inequity. In general, however, the optimum tax on
ability will involve a trade—off between vertical and horizontal
equity. The possiIlity of a trade—off of this kind has been
ignored in the literature on the model of differing abilities
because it has usually been assumed that informational constraints
permit the use of only one policy instrument, namely an income tax.
Changes in the ordering of utilities do not arise with an income
tax provided a uniform schedule applies to all individuals and the
marginal tax rate does not exceed 100%.But alternative policy
instruments (such as the use of lump—sum taxes when we can observea
variable which is highly, but not perfectly, correlated withability)
may well involve changes in ranking, and to evaluate these requires
explicit value judgments about both horizontal and vertical equity.
We shall illustrate below the role which these judgements play in
the construction of an index iof horizontal equity (section 3) and
also in a simple model of optimal taxation (section 6).
'See Mirrlees (1977), Dasgupta (1979)
2The equal utility outcome would also result froma "maxi—min"
objective function.—11—
3.Art Index of Horizàntal Equity
Consider a distribution of incomes
y1, y2, y ranked
in increasing order of income.We measure the changes in ordering
between the ex ante and ex post distributions by a scaled order
statistic which we shall define as
1
r. -r. 1 1
(1) 1N-i
where s,. iS the scaled order statistic (SOS) for household i
r. is the rank of household i in the ex post distribution
r. is the rank of household i in the ex ante distribution
1
N is the number of households in the distribution
The SOS value for each household lies between zero and unity,
these two extremes representing an unchanged order and a move from
one end of the distribution to the other, respectively.The statistic
is defined in the same way for a distribution of utilities, but for
simplicity we shall assume that we are concerned only with the
distribution of incomes. In this way our results may be easily
compared with existing measures of vertical inequality.The approach,
however, is general.
ttobjectivefl index of horizontal inequity would be some
function of the SOS values given in equation (1).One example would
be Spearman's rank correlation coefficient.The use of such an index
to compare changes in rankings, however, does not necessarily
Ties in rankings can be dealt with by the usual conventions.—12--
correspond to any social welfare function, and it seems preferable
to tackle this problem directly by constructing a normative index.
The aim is to rank distributions according to the




We shall normally wish to assume that W is an increasing
concave function of incomes, and a decreasing function of the SOS
values.
We define first the concept of the uniform reduction in
all incomes which, at the original ranking, produces the same level
of social welfare as that produced by the actual distribution given
the changes in ranking which take place.The unchanged ordering
equivalent proportion of income, i, is defined by
W(1iy1, 0, ...0)=
W(y1, N' S1,... SN) (3)
In other words, (1 —p)measures the proportion of total
income which, for a given distribution, we would be prepared to
sacrifice to eliminate all changes in ranking.A natural index of
horizontal inequity is therefore
(4)
We may define also an indec of vertical inequity.
Consider a compression of the distribution which maintains the
ordering of individuals.In the limit the ordering is maintained
but all incomes tend to a conmion value.Define y as the equally—13--
distributed level of income which is equivalent to the actual
distribution where both are evaluated at the initialranking
W(, ...r;O,...O)W(y1, N' O,...O) (5)
which gives the same level of welfare as the actual distributionat




where y is the mean of the distribution
is the proportion of total income which, fora given
ranking, we would be prepared to sacrifice to eliminate all vertical
inequality.
The index of overall inequality is defined in terms ofthe
equally distributed originally ranked equivalent level of income,
denoted by y*, and defined by
W(y*, .. .y*;0,. ..0) =W(y1, N' S• ...SN) (7)
The proportion of total income which we would beprepared
to sacrifice to eliminate all vertical and horizontalinequities is
given by the index of overall inequality.
(8)
y
The assptioi that W is an increasing andconcave function
of income and a decreasing function of the scaledorder statistic
guarantee that the three index ntbers lie between zero and—14—
unity.The relationship between them may be seen as follows.
From (3) and (7) we have
W()Jy1, 0, ...0)W(y*, •..y*;0,...0) (9)
If we impose the assumption that the measure of vertical
inequality is independent of the meanvalue of income, then from (5)
and (6) it follows that




(1 —I) (1 —IH)(1
—I) (12)
This result shows how the index of overall inequality may
be decomposed into its two component parts, the index of horizontal
inequity and the index of vertical inquality.The only condition
on W which is reauired for (12) to hold is that the measure of vertical
inequality is independent of the mean of the distribution; a similar
decomposition holds in the case of mean—dependence with (1 —i)
replaced by m(y) (1 —I)where m is some function of the mean income.'
Existing measures of vertical inquality are based on the assumption of
'The reader will note that the decomposition result holds for any
relevant characteristic denoted by s; and not just where s represents
the SOS value.—15—
1
mean_indePefle and we shallproceed in a like manner.
To convert the theoretical
definitions of inequalityinto
indexes which can be empiricallyestimated for particulardistributions,
we must place some
restrictions on the form ofthe function W.






This is a strong assumption.Sen (1973), in particular,
has discussed therestrictions implied by additive
separability —
namely,that the relative
social valuation of theincomes of two
individuals is independent
of the levels of anyother incomes. Never-
theless they enable usto construct anindex of horizontalineqUitY
which is both easily
interpreted and comparablewith normative
measures of verticalequity (such asAtkinson'S (1970) index)which
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are also based onthe assumption ofadditive separability.
The restrictions weshall place on thefunction F may be
summarisedinthe following threeconditions.
Conditionl
Let two individuals with
incomes y1 and y., and ranks r.1
andr., exchange placesin the distribution.Clearly, s =s
=
say.When horizontal equity is not anissue, an anonymitycondition
1This point is discussed further in Sen(1973) pps. 60—1
2For a discussion of additively separableinequality measures see
Covell (1980). He discusses the decompositionof an index of inequality
into indexes for separate groups which, although
related to some concepts
of horizontal equity, is rather differentfromourtreatment in terms
of changes in ordering.—16--
willensure that the social valuation
of the two incomelevels is
unchanged'. Acondition of this
type is obviously inappropriate
here, but we replace it
by the condition that therelativemarginalsocial
valuation of the incomelevels is unchanged.
Formally
F1(y, s) 1
f(y1,y) independent of s V s,y., (13) p F(y.,s)
where F1 denotes thesocial marginalutility of income(the derivative of F w.r.t.y.)




Notethatthis does notimply that the relative
valuation of
different incomes is
independent of thechange of ordering.
Constancy of the relative
valuation holdsonly if the individuals
at these income
levels have thesame value of thescaled order
statistic.
Condition 2
The second conditionis that the




single parameter,denoted by ,whichis assumed
to vary betweenzero (no aversion
to changes in ordering)to infinity
(complete aversionto changes in
ordering).
See, forexample, Sen (1973)p.10.— 17—
We may, therefore, write R as
R =R(s,Ti) (15)
The following restrictions imply no loss of generality.
When there is no change in the ordering the social valuation of
different income levels is given by the function V(y) and we may
write
R(O,ri) =1 (16)
Similarly, when no weight at all is attached to horizontal
inequity, the valuation of the distribution disregards any re-
ordering ,and
R(s, 0) =1 vs (17)
Consider an individual with income y and scaled order
statistic s.Suppose we now increase the change in his ranking by
a small amount ds.The proportionate increase in his income which
is equivalent (in terms of the social valuation) to the further
displacement is (from (14) and (15))
1
1 d 1 ldR
y ds k(y)R ds ''
wherek(y) is the elasticity of V with respect to y.
Integrating (18) we obtain
log R =c—k(y)g(s, y, r) (19)
'Strictly speaking, we may differentiate only when there is a
continuum of individuals.—18—
where c is the constant of integration, andg is the integral of f
with respect to s.It is easy to show that (16) and (17) imply that
c =0. If we assume that k is a constant, which is equivalent to
the property that our measure of vertical equity ismean—independent




Consider now two individuals with incomes
y1 and y2 and
intiai rankings and F2.Imaginea reform which results in their
exchanging positions.The cost of this reformmay be measured in
terms of the proportionate increase in theincomes of both
individuals which would benecessary to compensate for the change in
ordering.Denote the required increase by (A—i)and the SOS value,
which is the same for both,by s.Then A is defined by
V(Ay1)R(s) +V(Ay2)R(s)V(y1) +V(y2) (21)
With the constant elasticity formfor V we have
R(s) =1
(22)
Imagine now that the reform had instead beenimplemented in
two partial steps, the first of whichimplied an SOS value ofs1 for
both individuals and the second further
changed the ordering (in the—19—









Using (20) and taking logs we have
log A =g(s,n)
log A1 =g(s1,n) (26)
log A2 =g(s2,)
The final condition we shall impose is that the cost of the
reform is independent of the number of stages in which it is implemented,







This means that when s =5] + 2'g(s,n) =g(s1,ri)
+g(s2,r)
i.e. g is linear in Sincerepresents social preferences and
is constrained only to be positive we may norinalise such that3
g(s,n) =s (28)
1Note that (23) holds only when the various steps of a reform lead
inonotonically to the final change in ordering; when there is "over-
shooting" the equation does not hold.
is straightforward to generalise the proof to the case of many
steps of arbitrary size provided always that the steps form a monotonic
sequence for the ranking.
3Given that the normalisation must satisfy (17).-20-
Hence
-kfl S R(s,T))= e
(29)
From (18) and (29) we see that thispermits a natural
interpretation of the parameterrj measuring the degree of aversion to
horizontal inequity as the proportionateincrease in income required
to compensate for a unit change in theordering (measured by the
SOS value).
The above results enable us to state thefollowing theorem.
Theorem 1
Given Conditions 1—3, there isa unique social valuation
function F given by
I (y,s)=
—1ye j
n0, k 1 (30)
logy—s,when=
where k is the constant value of theelasticity of V w.r.t.y.
Atkinson (1970) has shown that if theindex of vertical
inequality is independent of themean then V has the constant elasticity
form (corresponding to constantrelative riBk aversion)
k
V(y) =L k1 (31) k
logy k=O
Combining this with the results derived above gives the form
(30).The economic explanation of the functional form (30) is the
following.There is a close analogy between the standard analysis
of risk aversion in consinner theory, and the aversion to vertical
and horizontal inequality as expressed in the social valuation function.—21—
Constant relative and absolute risk aversion imply special and veil—
knownformsfor individual utility functions, and this is true also
for the social valuation function.The assumption of mean—
independence for the index of vertical inequality is equivalent to
the property of constant relative inequality aversion, and hence the
social valuation function is of the constant elasticity form in income.
The assumption about aversion to changes in ordering embodied in
condition 3 is equivalent to the property of constant absolute re-
ordering aversion, and hence the change in ordering enters the social
valuation function in the exponential form.Although these are
strong assumptions, they provide a useful starting point and benchmark
for empirical work.
An implication of the result is that complete aversion to
horizontal equity is equivalent to placing no value on the incomes of
those individuals whose ordering in the distribution has changed. From
(30) we see that
lim F(y, s) =F(0,s) vs>0 (32)
n4.
Asthe degree of aversion to horizontal inequity increases
the social valuation of the incomes of all individuals whose ordering
has changed decreases.In the limit a change in ordering is
equivalent to reducing the incomes of those affected to zero.Complete
aversion to horizontal inequity implies that a reform which alters
the position in the ordering of every individual has the same effect
on social welfare as wiping out the whole of national income.
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i[iog -- s1' I ijJk0 (38)—23--
It can be checked by inspection that these expressions
satisfy (12).Not surprisingly, the index I is identical to the
Atkinson index of inequality.Define c =1—k.Then the index of
overall inequality is a function of two parameters, r and c, both of
which vary from zero to infinity, denoting the degrees of aversion to
horizontal and vertical inequity respectively.When horizontal
equity is a matter of no concern (r0) the index of overall inequality
reduces to I; similarly, when distributional considerations (in the
conventional sense of vertical equity) are disregarded (c =0)the
index of overall inequality is simply TH•In general, however, the
index of inequality depends upon both horizontal and vertical equity.
Given values of the parametersand c, and the ex ante and ex post
distributions, it is a straightforward matter to compute the different
measures of inequality)'
To calibrate the index of horizontal equity it may be
helpful to take an example.Consider the case when c =0(the
utility function is logarithmic in income) and imagine a reform which
completely reverses the original ranking.This corresponds exactly
to the first—best lump—sum tax system in the Nirrlees (1971) model
discussed above.A complete reversal of ranking of a continuum of
individuals implies anaverage SOS value 'of one—half, and from (34)
we see that the percentage of total income we are prepared to
sacrifice to eliminate the reversal of the rankings is 1 —
exp[_.-J.
This is equal to 4.8% when i0.1,22.1% when 11= 0.5,39.3% when
=1,and 63.2% when =2.
The definitions of the indexes inthe text are for discrete distributions;
the conversion to Continuous distributions is straightforward.—24—
The value forchosen to represent preferences about
horizontal equity will depend upon the degree of attachment to the
ranking of the initial distribution.For this reason it may well
be that the value of nchosenwill depend upon the reform being
analysed) In section 5 we shall illustrate the use of the equity
indexes by reference to the post—tax income distribution in the UK,
and we shall examine the sensitivity of the results to different
assumptions about the value of ri.
We may compare our index of horizontal inequity with
alternative measures which have been suggested. These tend to
concentrate on the unequal treatment of people assumed to be equal
initially, and thus have the weakness that they are not directly
concerned with changes in ordering as such.For example, Feldstein
(1976) considers, and rejects, the use of the variance of post—reform
utilities for a. grOup of individuals with equal utility before the
reform.Applied to a world in which everyone starts with a
different level of utility this measure is completely uninformative.
Rosen (1978) has suggested measuring horizontal inequity
in terms of increases in the differences between successive utility
levels in the ordering brought about by tax reform.His concept of
horizontal inequity is not confined to changes in ordering, which
has some advantages, but it is then impossible to decompose the
effects of a given tax reform into changes in vertical and
horizontal equity (as in (12) above).Moreover, his index is not
uniquely defined because it depends on an arbitrary randomisation
1Similar considerationsmay apply to the value of c.Feldstein (1976)
has suggested the use of different values of the vertical inequality
aversion parameter for different types of consumption.—25—
of utility levels.Nevertheless, there may be some aspects of
horizontal equity which are not captured simply by the change in
ordering, in which case our index could not be equated with
horizontal equity.
Johnson and Mayer (1962) suggest looking at the number of
"inequalities" which could be interpreted here as the number of
changes in ordering.The objection to this is the same as that to
the use of other ttobjectivet measures (e.g. the rank correlation
coefficient), namely that it gives no indication of the magnitude of
the change in terms of a measuring rod such as the fraction of
national income we are prepared to sacrifice to eliminate the
"inequities".This is precisely why we need a normative index
based on an explicit statement of the preferences about horizontal
equity.Only in this way is it possible to construct an index for
empirical analysis of tax and other reforms which involve a trade-
off between efficiency, vertical equity, and horizontal equity.
4.AnIndex of Social Mobility
In this section we shall try to show that the approach used
above may help to overcome some of the problems which have been
encountered in the literature on the measurement of social mobility.
Shorrocks (1978) has shown very clearly that an index of mobility
which satisfies the relatively innocuous conditions that it lie
between zero and unity and be monotonic in the scaled order statistic
is incompatible with an objective notion of perfect mobility.1 The
1This is usually defined in terms ofa transition matrix in which the
probability of ending up in any income group is the same for all groups.—26—
attempt to relax conditions on the index in order to reconcile the
measure with some objective concept of mobility does not seem to
have proved fruitful.Shorrocks concludes that "we may finally
have to admit that no single mobility statistic has the minimum
requirements regarded as essential". (op.cit. p.1023).An alternative
approach is to construct a normative index along the lines pursued
above. The only difference is that it is usual in the context of
social mobility to favour changes in the ordering of the distribution.
As before, we shall assume that distributions may be ranked
according to the social welfare function (2) where we assume that F
is now an increasing function of s.We further define the
concept of the uniform increase in all incomes which, with zero
mobility, produces the same level of social welfare as that produced
by the actual distribution given the mobility which exists.The
zero mobility equivalent proportion of income, p, is defined by
F(py., 0) =F(y.,s.) (39)
I I
Given our assumptions p 1.The proportion of total income
which, from a position of zero mobility, we would be prepared to
sacrifice in order to achieve the degree of mobility we observe is
—1], andso a natural index of mobility is
IM=lj
(40)
We may write down an exact form for the index if we are
prepared to impose further conditions on F. Parallel to conditions
1—3 above, we may define—27—
(].')Iftwo individuals in the distribution exchange places the relative
marginal social valuation of the two income levels is unchanged.
(2') The desire for mobility may be represented by a single parameter,
denoted by y, which varies between zero (no preference for mobility)
to infinity (complete aversion to immobility).
(3') The benefits of a reform which increases mobility are
independent of the number of stages in which the reform is implemented,
provided that no stage reverses a change in ordering brought about by
a previous stage. (Note that this condition is not concerned with
the speed at which a reform is implemented which, in general, would
alter our valuation of changes in ordering.The social valuation
function takes no account of the time dimension of reform). Since F
is an increasing function of s, it is easy to show that conditions
l'—3' imply that (29) becomes
ky s
R(s, y)e (41)
We may now state
Theorem 3
Given conditions l'—3' there is a unique index of mobility







(42)shows that the index of mobility depends upon both
the degree of desire for mobility and the degree of inequality
aversion.Consequently, any index of mobility is based on some
preferences (usually implicit) about vertical inequality.For
example, Bartholomew's (1976) index of social mobility is proportional
to the average change in SOS values
B= s (43)
Hence when V(y) takes the logarithmic form (k =0)
1 —e' (44)
and is an increasing function of B.
In other words,the use of Bartholomew's index to rank
distributions according to their degree of mobility, is equivalent to
assuming a value for the inequality aversion parameter c of unity.
It is interesting to note that the extent to which Bartholomew's
index is useful as a measure of mobility depends upon our attitudes
towards vertical inequality.
The mobility index may be used to evaluate reforms which
increase mobility at: the: expense of an increase in inequality. If we
consider reforms which preserve the mean of the distribution then, by
arguments parallel to those embodied in equations (9)—(12),it may be
shown that social welfare is an increasing function of (1 —
Considera class of mean—preserving reforms characterised by a
policy variable x such that the indexes are concave differentiable
functions of x.The optimal policy is given by—29—
E(M) =E(V)
(45)
where E(M) and E(V) are theelasticities of (1 — and
(1 —L)respectively with respect to x.
5.An Empirical Application
The principal use of the indexof horizontal equity is to
examine the impact of tax reformsusing large data files in which
it is possible to
compute the change in ranking for each ofa large
sample of individuals or households.To demonstrate the use of the
index, however, we present some illustrativecalculations for the
distribution of household incomes inthe UK.Table 2 shows the
distribution of incomes by decilesfor a sample of 7,198 households
taken from the 1977 FamilyExpenditure Survey.Col. (1) shows the
distribution of "original" income(defined as factor incomesplus
cash transfers).Col. (2) shows the distributionof income after
taxes and benefits (except forpublic expenditure on defence, law
and order and public investment)1.
From the available data it isimpossible to calculate the
changes in ranking of each household inthe sample.But the Royal
Commission on the Distribution ofIncome and Wealth had access to
the same data and found that 4l.5Zof households in the distribution
of original income had movedup or down one decile in the distribution
of final income, and that 27.5%had moved by more than one decile.
1
Details of the assumptions aboutincidence used to compute the
distributions are given in EconomicTrends January 1979.Clearly, many of these changes weredeliberate and represented the
use of taxes and benefits totake account of differing "needs" such
as household size and age.But others were not, and in Col. (3)
we show a plausible representationof the change in ordering induced
by the process of redistribution.Six of the decile groups have an
unchanged order, and four move up or down onedecile.Table 3 shows
the index of horizontal inequality (defined by(33)) for the change
in the distributions for different valuesof the two inequality
aversion parameters.The parameters may be interpreted as follows.
If we attach the same social value to a marginaldollar in the hands
of someone with income y as to x dollarsfor someone with income Ay,
then x =A6.For example, when c =0.5,one dollar taken from some-
one on twice average earnings hasthe same social value as 50 cents
given to a person on one—half average earnings.The social value
attached to the income, y, of a person who has changedposition in
the distribution is equal to the social valueof an income ye.
When Ti= 0.5this is equivalent to a reduction in income ofabout 5%
for a change in ordering of one decile, andwhen Ti= 5the equivalent
reduction is about 40%.
Table 4 shows the index of overall inequalityfor both the
originalandfinaldistribut1orlso
The first two columns correspond
also to the index of vertical inequality.It can be checked that
the Lorenz curve for the final distributionlies entirely within
that for the original distribution, and, therefore, asfar as vertical
inequality is concerned, the redistributionis unambiguously desirable.
But for some values of the horizontal inequityaversion parameters the
10550fhoizontaIequityOff6etSthe gain in vertical equality,and
the index of overall inequality is greater forthe final distributionTABLE 2 DISTRIBUTION OF
-HOUSEHOLDINCOMES, UK 1977
(El 4nnum)
DECILE Original Income After Taxes and Benefits
(including cash benefits)
Income Ranking in Initial
Distribution
Bottom 1090 1141 2
2 1658 1674 1
3 2431 2166 3
4 3267 2668 4
5 4014 3198 5
6 4740 3709 6
7 5476 4253 8
8 6357 4914 7
9 7640 5867 9
10 11,343 8491 10
Mean 4802 3808
Source Economic Trends January 1979, Tables 9 and 12.— 39_
TABLE 3INDEX OF HORIZONTAL INEQUITY
0.5 1.0 5.0
0 .017 .033 .134
0.5 .019 .038 .164
E 1.0 .022 - .044 .200
2.0 .030 .059 .282
TABLE 4 INDEX OF OVERALL INEQUALITY
Original Distribution Final Distribution
11
0 0.5 1.0 5.0
O 0
1 o .017 .033 .134
0.5 .093 .072 .090 .107 .224
c 1.0 .187 .143 .162 .181 .314
2.0 .361 .274 .296 .317 .479— 3—
than for the original distribution.This occurs, for example, when
ii= 5for the values of c shown in Table 4. If we ignore the
efficiency costs of the process of redistribution, we may rank
distributions according to the value of the index of overall inequality.
From (37) we see that this means there is a trade—off between
vertical and horizontal equity.The trade—off for the distribution
of incomes in the UK is shown in Figure 1.For combinations of the
inequity aversion parameters to the north—west of the indifference
line II, the final distribution is preferred to the original
distribution, whereas for combinations to the south—east the status
quo is preferred. Diagrams such as figure 1 may be a useful way of
presenting information about a proposed reform to policy—makers.
6. An Application to Optimal Taxation
Administrative errors are one source of horizontal inequities
and we present below a highly simplified model to illustrate the
application of the approach developed above.Stern (1979) has
explored optimal lump—sum taxes in a model in which there was a fixed
probability that indviduals (either skilled or unskilled) were
incorrectly classified.He computed the optimal level of taxes for
a utilitarian social welfare function.We shall consider a simple
version of his model and examine explicitly the trade—off between
horizontal and vertical equity.To do this we allow the probability















































Consider a centrally planned economy in which thereare two
groups with fixed endowments y1 and y2 (y2 >
y1;mean income =y).
social welfare is a concave function of individualconsumption
levels.The planner allocates consumption bundles directly (using
local administrators) which can be seen as equivalent toimposing
lump—sum taxes such that
c y, +a aO (46)
C2
= — a
When the planner can be sure that the local administrators
make no mistakes he will choose taxes togive equal consumption levels.
We now introduce administrative errors.Suppose that the planner
knows the relative numbers of the twogroups in each region and
allocates consumption accordingly.The local administrators are
told to allocate consumption c. topeople with income y1.But they
sometimes confuse the groups and withprobability p make an error.
We shall assume that p is an increasing functionof a, perhaps
because when the consumption bundlesare very different the local
administrators try hard not to make mistakes butthey become
careless when distributing roughly similar bundles.In general, the
optimal tax will depend on the trade—off between verticaland
horizontal equity.'There are certain special cases. When ii0,
the optimal outcome is complete equality forany positive c, and when
c =0the solution is to impose no taxes ifri is positive.
1Because of thevery simple structure of the model examinedhere, it seems less plausible that the plannerwould be concerned about changes in ordering as theconsumption levels tend to equality, butthe results are intended to be illustrativeonly.—35--














The solution depends on the function p(a).A sufficient,
though not necessary, condition for the first—order condition to
yield a local maximum is that p be convex.Consider the simplest







It is easy to show that the solution is the following
(i) jf<r*,there is an interior solution given by
(y—a) =(y2—y1—2a)(y—y1)
(49)
(A—i) = — ,whereAy2/y1
2A
(ii)if ri ri*, a =0and the optimal solution involves no taxes.
7. Conclusions
We have shown that if we are prepared to define vertical
and horizontal inequity as a mean—preserving spread and a change in
ranking respectiveiy,::it is possible to construct an index of overall
-- 36—
inequality which decomposes into two measures of vertical and
horizontal inequity.Provided certain conditions are accepted, these
indexes are uniquely defined as a function of two inequity aversion
parameters. It is hoped that the indexes will prove useful in the
evaluation of tax proposals (to examine the trade—off between
vertical and horizontal equity), and also as a measure of social
mobility.
Horizontal equity is an elusive concept, and it is most
unlikely that a single index will capture all the different
interpretations which have been given to it.For example, it has
been argued that little importance should be attached to a change
in ordering per Se, but that concern for horizontal equity restricts
the use of certain tax instruments.'Our index is limited to those
cases where changes in ordering do affect social valuations.It is
based on strong assumptions, but the aim has been to construct an
index which may be of use in empirical research, always bearing in
mind Sen's (1973, p.76) stricture that "the glib man who can make
inequality comparisons perfectly between every pair of distributions
and the wise guy who finds all such comparisons 'arbitrary' both
seem to miss essential aspects of the concept of inequality".
'See Atkinson (1980) for a discussion of alternative views.—37—
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